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OR most countries, the behavior of their corporations as key insti-
tutions in the generation and allocation of society's resources is a
subject of vital concern. Therefore distinct, complex systems of
corporate governance to regulate corporate behavior have evolved.
Scholars have sought to explain the diversity of these systems on a variety
of grounds: the quest for economic efficiency,' the existence of political
constraints on financial institutions, 2 and the differing nature of legal sys-
tems.3 While each of these factors has certainly been important in shap-
ing systems of corporate governance around the world, one other
significant factor that has received relatively little attention is culture.
Corporate regulatory systems in both law and practice have been shaped
not only by national policies, but also by the cultures of the countries
concerned. As globalization proceeds and interaction among countries
intensifies, one may ask whether the differing systems for regulating cor-
porations, based as they are on strong cultural preferences, present op-
portunities for convergence, cooperation, or conflict. Will Europe, for
example, eventually have its corporations in the American style? Will the
United States come to appreciate corporations with a European touch?
The purpose of this paper is to explore the link between culture and cor-
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Diplomacy, Tufts University. Visiting Professor University of London (SOAS &
QMW). Fulbright Distinguished Chair in Comparative Law in Italy (2000). Inde-
pendent director of mutual funds listed on the New York Stock Exchange. This
article is a revised version of a paper originally presented at the conference on
"Transatlantic Perspectives on US-EU Economic Relations: Convergence, Coop-
eration, and Conflict," April 11-12, 2002, hosted by the John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, and later in modified form at a colloquium on
Corporate Governance, organized by the British Institute of International and
Comparative Law, London, June 6, 2002.
1. Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America's Failing Capital Investment Sys-
tem, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 65.
2. Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 10 (1991).
3. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence
in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 644 (1999).
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porate governance, and to speculate on the possibilities for convergence
of corporate governance systems in the future.
For the last twenty-five years, American public policy concern with cor-
porate behavior has periodically expressed itself as two distinct themes:
"corporate social responsibility" and "corporate governance." The theme
of corporate social responsibility has focused on the impact of corporate
activity on society-primarily on corporations' obligations to various ex-
ternal groups and constituencies. By contrast, corporate governance has
primarily concerned the internal organization, rules, and relationships of
the corporation itself, especially its obligations to its shareholders. The
emphasis in American public debate on one theme or the other has
tended to ebb and flow with time and events. Thus, American invest-
ments in South Africa during the Apartheid era were criticized as viola-
tions of corporate social responsibility. On the other hand, the collapse
of Enron in 2001 and the financial scandals uncovered in other American
corporations are seen as failures of corporate governance, provoking
widespread demands for governance reform.
Europe, except for the United Kingdom, does not seem to have sepa-
rated the issues of corporate governance from corporate responsibility as
sharply in public discussion as has the United States. Moreover, Euro-
pean countries appear to have devoted relatively more attention to the
social role of corporations in the community, and somewhat less attention
to the specific question of "corporate governance," as that term has tradi-
tionally been understood in the United States and England. For that rea-
son, it is important at the outset to determine whether corporate
governance means the same thing on both sides of Atlantic.
II. DEFINING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The term "corporate governance" appears to have arisen and entered
into prominent usage in the mid-to-late 1970s in the United States in the
wake of the Watergate scandal and the discovery that major American
corporations had engaged in secret political contributions at home and
corrupt payments abroad.4 Eventually it gained currency elsewhere as a
subject distinct from corporate management or corporate organization.
Students and practitioners of corporate governance give the term a
wide variety of definitions. Economists and social scientists have tended
to define it broadly as "the institutions that influence how business corpo-
rations allocate resources and returns ' 5 and "the organizations and rules
that affect expectations about the exercise of control of resources in
firms."' 6 One noted economist has rather cryptically written that govern-
4. E. Norman Veasey, The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a New Legal Dis-
cipline, 48 Bus. L. 1267 (1993).
5. Mary O'Sullivan, Corporate Governance and Globalization, 570 AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci. 153, 154 (2000).
6. WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT REPORT: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS
FOR MARKETS (2002), at 68, available at http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/
fulltext/fm.pdf
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ance is "an institutional framework in which the integrity of the transac-
tion is decided."' 7 These broad definitions encompass not only the
internal structure of the corporation but also its external environment,
including capital and labor markets, bankruptcy systems, and governmen-
tal competition policies.
Corporate managers, investors, policy makers and lawyers, on the
other hand, tend to employ a narrower definition. For them, corporate
governance is the system of rules and institutions that determine the con-
trol and direction of the corporation and define relations among the cor-
poration's primary participants-shareholders, the board of directors,
and company management. 8 This narrower definition focus almost exclu-
sively on the internal structure and operation of the corporation's deci-
sion-making processes. This definition has been central to public policy
discussions about corporate governance in the United States and many
other countries. For example, the OECD Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance,9 aimed at corporations in both Europe and the North America,
deal with only five topics: I. The Rights of Shareholders; II. The Equita-
ble Treatment of Shareholders; III. The Role of Stakeholders in Corpo-
rate Governance; IV. Disclosure and Transparency; and V. The
Responsibility of the Board.
Corporate governance as a public policy issue (though not as a label) in
the United States finds its origins in The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, the classic work by Adolf Berle, Jr., a law professor, and Gar-
diner Means, an economist, first published in 1932.10 Berle and Means
examined the growing concentration of economic power in the modern
corporation and noted the rise of professional managers having opera-
tional control of large corporations, but little or no ownership of the en-
terprise.11 They also pointed to the increasing dispersion of corporate
7. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 11 (1996).
8. See ROBERT A. G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 (2d ed.
1995), defining corporate governance as the "relationship among various partici-
pants in determining the direction and performance of corporations. The primary
participants are (1) shareowners, (2) management (led by the chief executive of-
ficer) and (3) the board of directors." See also CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEES' RET. SYS.,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORE PRINCIPLES & GUIDELINES (1998), available at
http://www.calpers.org. (last updated Apr. 13, 1998) [hereinafter Calpers], which
explicitly adopts this definition. Similarly, the United Kingdom's 1992 Cadbury
Reports often quoted: "Corporate governance is the system by which businesses
are directed and controlled." Cadbury Comm., Report of the Committee on the
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, para. 2.5 (Dec. 1992), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/privatesector/cg/codes.htm.
9. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, OECD Principles of
Corporate Governance, (endorsed by the Ministers at the OECD Meeting, 26-27
May 1999), Paris, OECD, 1999, available at www.oecd.org [hereinafter OECD
Principles of Corporate Governance]. The American Law Institute's Principles of
Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (St. Paul, Minn.: Ameri-
can Law Institute Publishers, 1994) takes a similarly narrow view of the subject's
scope.
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shares among a growing number of persons who, because they were nu-
merous, widely scattered, and had relatively small interests, were not able
to exercise control over the corporation they owned. 12 This divorce of
ownership from control in the modern American corporation posed a
challenge to the interests of shareholders. 13 Berle and Means viewed cor-
porate governance (a term that appears nowhere in their book) as a class-
ical agency problem: how could corporate managers as agents of the
shareholders, be induced to manage corporate assets in the best interests
of their principals? 14
Recently, some scholars have disputed the applicability of the Berle
and Means model of the modern publicly traded corporation to countries
outside of the United States. Finding that dispersed share ownership is
largely an American and British phenomenon, they have argued that be-
cause large publicly traded corporations in other countries, for example
in Europe, Latin America, and Japan, are to a significant extent run by
control groups with substantial equity interests, the basic problem of cor-
porate governance in those countries is to protect minority shareholders
from expropriation by controlling parties.' 5 The difference in the concen-
tration of shareholder ownership in corporations between the United
States and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and the European con-
tinent on the other is striking. For example, among 1309 corporations
listed on the New York Stock Exchange and 2831 corporations on the
NASDAQ, one study found that the median size of block holding by an
investor group was less than the minimum required disclosure level of 5
percent.' 6 In the United Kingdom, out of 1926 listed companies, less than
3 percent had shareowners with majority control.' 7 Another study found
that out of 250 listed, non-financial companies in the U.K., the median
block holder controlled only 9.9 percent of votes.' 8 On the other hand, in
50 percent of non-financial listed companies in Austria, Belgium, Ger-
many, and Italy, a single investor or related group of investors controlled
more than 50 percent of voting stock. 19 In 50 percent of listed companies
in the Netherlands, France, Spain, and Sweden, a single block holder (an
individual or related group of investors) controlled more than 43.5 per-
cent, 20 percent, 34.5 percent, and 34.9 percent respectively of voting




15. Rafael La Porta, et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471,
471-517 (1999).
16. Colin Mayer, Corporate Cultures and Governance: Ownership, Control and Gov-
ernance of European and U.S. Corporations (Mar. 31, 2002) (unpublished paper,
conference draft), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/conferences/us-
eu-relations/meyer corporate-culture-governance.pdf.
17. See THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE OXFORD (Fabrizio Baraca & Marco
Becht eds., 2001).




traded corporations is more concentrated in Europe than it is in the
United States and the United Kingdom. In addition, a larger percentage
of the United States population are shareowners compared to European
countries. For example, whereas one half of all American adults directly
or indirectly own corporate shares, only one in five Germans is a
shareowner. 21
The statistical patterns that emerge with respect to corporate share
ownership concentration lead to the conclusion that, in general terms,
America and Europe offer two basically different types of publicly traded
corporations: the "manager-dominated model," which prevails in the
United States and the United Kingdom, and the "controlling share-
holder-dominated model," which prevails throughout most of the Euro-
pean continent. While this difference in share ownership structure
between the United States and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and
countries on the European continent on the other, is real, a central prob-
lem of corporate governance on both continents arises out of the separa-
tion of ownership and control underscored by Berle and Means. That
problem is protecting minority shareholders from those in control,
whether the controllers are professional managers without substantial
ownership interests who would manage the corporation largely in their
own interests, or shareholders with a controlling interest who would
trample on the rights of the minority.
The corporate governance problem identified by Berle and Means sev-
enty years ago has not diminished in the United States since the publica-
tion of their seminal work. Indeed, as the ownership of corporate shares
by American households-both directly and through financial institu-
tions-has increased and spread dramatically throughout American soci-
ety, the principal concern of investors, practitioners, and scholars of
corporate governance in the United States has been how to protect the
legitimate rights and interests of shareholders when faced with managers
who control the corporation. The collapse of Enron and the financial
scandals at other large American corporations have re-ignited public con-
cern with the question of corporate governance, in the sense of how to
devise systems, rules, and institutions that will induce corporate execu-
tives to manage corporate assets in the interests of the shareholders, in-
stead of their own interests. The spectacle of certain Enron top managers
emerging from the their bankrupt corporation with substantial financial
gains, while investors and employee shareholders sustained large losses,
has only served to highlight the problems posed by the divorce of owner-
ship from control in large American corporations and to focus renewed
attention on the need to reform corporate governance.22
21. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2002, at WK 4.
22. Enron employees have been injured in two respects: (i) through loss of their jobs
and (ii) through loss of their retirement savings invested in Enron stock. Public
concern seems to have focused primarily on the latter (i.e. the injury to Enron
employees as shareholders).
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Although the fundamental agency problem has not changed, what has
changed since the time of Berle and Means is the rise of institutional
investors, propelled to a significant extent by the nature of the privately
funded U.S. retirement system and the aging of the American population.
The dispersion of share ownership, which served to render shareholders
powerless, has been countered to some extent by the growing concentra-
tion of corporate shares in the hands of mutual funds, pension funds, and
other institutional investors who have shown increasing willingness to ad-
vocate actively for shareholder interests and good governance within the
corporations whose shares they manage. 23 Institutional investors in the
United States and the United Kingdom continue to view the corporate
governance problem essentially as one of assuring that the corporation is
managed in the best interests of its shareowners. 24 Indeed, because fund
managers are compensated by how well they maximize shareholder value
in relation to a stated "benchmark," they have powerful incentives to do
SO.
Many Europeans consider the traditional American definition of cor-
porate governance, with its central preoccupation on protecting share-
holder rights and interests, to be too narrow. For those on the European
continent, particularly in France and Germany where share ownership is
much less dispersed among the public than it is in the United States,25 the
central preoccupation of corporate governance should not be the rights of
shareholders in relation to managers, but rather the rights of the commu-
nity in relation to the corporation itself.26 For Americans, corporate gov-
ernance is about shareholders controlling managers for purposes of
shareholder profit (managerial responsibility); whereas for many Europe-
ans it is about society controlling corporations for purposes of social wel-
fare (corporate social responsibility). Thus, unlike Americans who have
tended to separate issues of corporate governance from corporate social
responsibility, Europeans have joined the two themes in discussions
about how corporations should be managed and regulated. The differ-
ence in definition and perspective on the nature and purpose of corporate
governance makes it essential that in any trans-Atlantic dialogue on "cor-
porate governance" the two sides recognize that at times they may really
be talking about two different things.
23. It is estimated that out of the total market value of all publicly traded shares of $30
trillion in the United States at the end of 1999, $20 trillion was under some form of
professional management. See Social Investment Forum, 1999 Report on Socially
Responsible Investing Trends in the United States (Nov. 4, 1999), available at http:l/
www.socialinvest.org/area/research/trends/1999-Trends.htm.
24. Many institutional investors prefer the term "shareowner," to "shareholder." The
California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), the largest public
pension fund in the United States with assets of $143 billion and an active advocate
of good corporate governance, has stated that "shareowner" is preferable because
it "reflects our view that equity ownership carries with it active responsibilities and
is not merely passive 'holding' shares." Calpers, supra note 8.
25. La Porta, supra note 15; see also, Coffee, supra note 3, at 644-45.
26. EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 164 (Margaret M. Blair and Mark J.
Roe eds., 1999).
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III. THE SOURCES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The rules and mechanisms of corporate governance come from a wide
variety of sources, both public and private. A primary source is the com-
pany or corporation law of the individual countries concerned. This legis-
lation governs the creation, basic structure and primary rules of operation
of the company, corporation, socigtg anonyme, akientgesellschaft, or other
corporate legal form that a firm chooses to take. It also states some of
the basic rights of shareholders, including the right to vote, to receive
information about company matters, and to challenge management deci-
sions in court. The nature of these rights varies significantly from country
to country. Some countries offer stronger protection to shareholders
than others.27
In the United States, which has a federal system of law, each of the fifty
states has its own corporation code.2 8 In addition, judicial decisions by
state courts have developed important legal doctrines governing corpo-
rate behavior, such as "the business judgment rule" and the duties of care
and loyalty of corporate officers and directors. American state corporate
laws have a high degree of similarity, but they are not identical. Indeed,
the corporate laws of certain states may favor one interest group over
another. Throughout the twentieth century, individual American states,
seeking to maximize revenues from corporate franchise taxes, engaged in
competition to become the state of incorporation for U.S. companies. A
winner in this competition, the small state of Delaware is the legal home
to about 60 percent the Fortune 500 companies, America's largest pub-
licly traded corporations, because managers have considered Delaware
law to be favorable to their interests. As a result, the Delaware courts
have been the sites of important corporate litigation over the years, and
their decisions have been influential in shaping various doctrines of cor-
porate governance. Europe has not experienced a similar competition for
corporations among countries, and European law has tended to inhibit
the kind of corporate mobility experienced in the United States.
A second important source of corporate governance are national rules
and regulations with respect to the sale, distribution and trading of securi-
ties involving the public. One basic goal of securities regulation in virtu-
ally all countries is to assure that investors receive adequate information
about the corporation and its activities so that they may make investment
decisions and exercise shareholder rights appropriately. As with corpora-
tion laws and codes, the extent of protection afforded to shareholders by
securities legislation varies from country to country.
27. See La Porta, supra note 15, at 1141-43 (evaluating the effective of enforcement in
forty-nine countries).
28. One authority on corporate governance has pointed out that the law governing
corporate governance in the United States "is relatively unique in the great num-
ber of sources by which it is shaped." Melvin Aron Eisenberg, An Overview of the
Principles of Corporate Governance, 48 Bus. L. 1271, 1273 (1993).
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Although the United States has no federal corporate law, federal secur-
ities laws, principally the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities Ex-
change Act, as well as the voluminous regulations issued by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, are a central element of corporate govern-
ance for firms that raise capital from the public or whose shares are pub-
licly traded. While still subject to individual state laws on many aspects of
internal governance, publicly traded companies must at the same time
respect the complex federal rules, on a wide range of governance matters
from informing shareholders about corporate activity to conducting au-
dits of corporate accounts. The structure of federal law tends to give a
high degree of uniformity to the systems of corporate governance of pub-
licly.traded corporations throughout the country. Federal legislation cov-
ering labor, antitrust, and taxation also have important consequence for
American systems of corporate governance.
The principal source of corporate governance in Europe is the legisla-
tion of the individual European country concerned. Although European
Union legislation does have an impact on certain aspects of corporate
governance, it has not unified corporate governance practice to the same
extent as the combination of U.S. federal law and regulations, and the
New York Stock Exchange and NSDAQ rules, have tended to unify
American practices. Thus, there is a greater divergence in corporate gov-
ernance rules among publicly traded European corporations than there is
among their American counterparts.
In addition to the nature of the laws and regulations on corporate gov-
ernance, one must also consider the quality of law enforcement in the
countries concerned. The effectiveness of corporate governance legisla-
tion and regulation depends of course on the competence, integrity, and
forcefulness of the courts and regulatory agencies in each country. On
this issue, one also finds significant variations among countries.
The rules and decisions of certain private bodies, such as stock ex-
changes, professional accounting institutions, and industry organizations,
also influence corporate governance. Thus the rules of the New York
Stock Exchange address many elements of corporate governance and are
obligatory for corporations who have their shares traded on the "Big
Board. '' 29 Invoking that powerful lever, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002,30 a major legislative response to the scandals at Enron, Arthur An-
derson, and other corporations, compelled the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission to direct the securities exchanges and national
associations of securities dealers to adopt rules, applicable to the corpora-
tions which they traded, on a wide range of corporate governance matters
including audit committees, independence of directors, and the composi-
tion of boards of directors.31
29. For the rules of the New York Exchange applicable to listed companies, see
www.nyse.com.
30. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002).
31. Id.
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Accounting plays a vital role in corporate governance because of its
fundamental role in any disclosure regime concerning information about
companies' activities. A strong disclosure regime is essential for the exer-
cise of shareholder rights, for monitoring corporate activity, and for im-
posing discipline on management. Without effective and uniform
accounting standards and practices, however, meaningful disclosure can-
not take place. For example, the lack of agreement within the American
accounting profession as to the need to treat stock option grants to execu-
tives as a current expense led to overstatement of earnings of some cor-
porations, thereby inflating valuations of their stock on securities
markets. As a result, the accounting rules and practices and professional
organizations such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
in the United States and the International Accounting Standards Board
in Europe (IASB) are yet another important source of corporate govern-
ance. Part of the corporate disclosure system, technically outside of the
formal institutions of corporate governance but which shareholders rely
on and managers try to influence, are financial analysts of broker-dealer
firms, credit rating agencies, and the financial press. 32
Within the limits of law, regulations, and the applicable rules of private
regulatory bodies, corporations have discretion to shape their own inter-
nal mechanisms of corporate governance, including the terms of manag-
ers' contracts, the composition of corporate boards, and the internal
structure of the corporation, to mention just a few. The degree of discre-
tion varies from country to country. The traditional legal mobility of
American corporations from state to state and the broad discretion af-
forded to corporate organizers tend to reflect a basic "enabling ap-
proach" (i.e., everything is permitted unless it is specifically prohibited)
of American corporate law. Conversely, there are greater restrictions on
mobility and discretion in Europe that reveal a more "mandatory" ap-
proach (i.e., everything is prohibited unless specifically permitted) that
seems to characterize European corporate law and practice.
In order to influence the exercise of this discretion, industry groups and
institutional investors' have prepared codes, reports, and statements of
corporate governance that they have presented to, or pressed upon the
management of corporations. In the United States, the Business Round
Table, a leading organization of corporate executives, and institutional
investors, such as the California Public Employees' Retirement System
32. All U.S. publicly traded corporations are subject to the accounting and auditing
standards set forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). At pre-
sent, Europe has no single, agreed upon set of standards. As part of its efforts to
create a single European market in financial services, the European Commission
has directed that by 2005 most EU listed companies should prepare their financial
statements using international accounting standards that are currently being for-
mulated by the International Accounting Standards Board, a private group based
in London. By 2007, all EU listed companies are to use common international
standards. David Tweedie, Tackling A Crisis in Financial Reporting, 11 EUR. Bus.
FORUM 19, 19-21 (2002).
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(CalPERS) and TIAA-CREF, have been active participants in this
movement.
Europe has also engaged in a similar exercise, primarily at the country,
rather than the continental level. During the 1990s, prestigious groups
and organizations within individual European countries produced over
thirty recommended codes of best practices in corporate governance.33
They include The Cadbury Report (U.K., 1992), Vi6not Reports I and II
(France, 1995 and 1999), Peters Report (Netherlands, 1997), and the
Mertzanis Report (Greece 1999).3 4 And finally, an important multilat-
eral effort to define best practices in corporate governance for both Eu-
rope and North America is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development's Principles of Corporate Governance, adopted in
1999.35 None of these codes and reports is binding on corporations, but
they have served to heighten awareness of corporate governance issues,
to establish goals toward which corporations should work, and to frame
and influence policy discussions.
In view of the complexity of the issues and the diversity of sources, a
discussion of U.S. and European corporate governance in a short article
faces a challenge in determining the precise elements to be covered. Fol-
lowing the approach of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
and the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance:
Analysis and Recommendations,36 it adopts a narrow definition of corpo-
rate governance and focuses primarily on the rules governing the corpo-
ration's basic internal institutions. 37
Despite their high degree of complexity and technicality, the rules of
corporate governance in both the United States and Europe have not
evolved in response to economic and political imperatives alone. The dif-
fering cultures of the United States and Europe have also played impor-
tant roles.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
TO CULTURE
Rules and institutions are shaped by the culture of the societies in
which they function. Definitions of "culture" are as numerous as defini-
33. For a comprehensive listing of these codes and reports, see WEIL, GOTSHAL &
MANGES, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES RELEVANT
TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES, 14-16 (Jan. 2002), available
at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal-marketlen/company/news/corp-gov
[hereinafter WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES STUDY].
34. Id.
35. OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 9.
36. A.L.I. Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (1994).
37. Id. The two-volume statement consists of seven parts: I. Definitions; II. The Ob-
jective and Conduct of the Corporation; III. Corporate Structure: Functions and
Powers of Directors and Officers, Audit Committee in Large Publicly Held Corpo-
rations; III Recommendations of Corporate Practice Concerning the Board and
the Principal Oversight Committees; IV. Duty of Care and Business Judgment
Rule; V. Duty of Fair Dealing; VI. Role of Directors and Shareholders in Transac-
tions in Control and Tender Offers; and VII. Remedies.
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tions of "governance." For some scholars, culture is "the way in which a
group of people solves problems and reconciles dilemmas,"38 for others
culture is "an integrated pattern of basic assumptions, values and artifacts
that sets the stage for action, belief, and policy."' 39 For purposes of this
article, culture is defined as the socially transmitted behavior patterns,
attitudes, norms, and values of a given community.40 Depending on the
nature of the inquiry, the community in question may be a nationality, an
ethnicity, an organization, or a profession.
One may conceive of the four cultural elements mentioned above-
behavior, attitudes, norms and values-as forming a series of concentric
circles like the layers of an onion, as illustrated below.
The process of understanding a specific culture is similar to peeling an
onion. The outer most layer of the onion is behavior, the words and ac-
tions of persons from the culture working within the corporation; for ex-
ample, the way shareholder meetings are organized and conducted. A
second layer consists of the attitudes of persons within a given community
toward specific events and phenomena; for example the attitudes about
economic competition. Next are norms, the rules to be followed by mem-
bers of the corporation in specific situations. The inner most layer - the
core that orients and shapes all the other layers - consists of values and
fundamental beliefs; for example, whether an organization or community
has a strong attachment to the value of individualism or to communitari-
anism, a value preference that can profoundly impact a wide range of
38. ALFONS TROMPENAARS & CHARLES HAMPDEN-TURNER, RIDING THE WAVES OF
CULTURE: UNDERSTANDING CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN GLOBAL BUSINESS 6 (2d
ed., 1998).
39. WILLIAM C. FREDERICK, VALUES, NATURE AND CULTURE IN THE AMERICAN
CORPORATION 88 (1995).
40. Jeswald W. Salacuse, Intercultural Negotiation in International Business, 8 GROUP
DECISION AND NEGOTIATION 217, 218-221 (1999).
20031
44 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 9
systems from compensation to decision making. One of the essential
characteristics of a value is the belief by an individual or group that a
specific conduct is personally or socially preferable to an opposite
conduct. 4 1
Culture has two basic and crucial social functions: (1) to permit a com-
munity or organization to survive and adapt to the external environment,
and (2) to integrate its internal processes and personnel to ensure its ca-
pacity to survive and adapt.42 Thus a culture can be viewed as a system of
survival that a community has developed over time in response to the
challenges that it has encountered as a group. As will be seen, the United
States and Europe, while holding many values and beliefs in common,
also differ with respect to the importance attached to two important cul-
tural values: individualism and communitarianism. Their differing histo-
ries may explain the difference in their value preference between the
individual and the community.
In addition to national cultures, individual corporations have their own
corporate culture. While U.S. law tends to foster a degree of uniformity
in corporate governance among publicly traded companies in the United
States, corporate culture, driven by the internal dynamics of individual
enterprises tends to display much more diversity. For example, the cul-
ture of a family-run company differs significantly from that of a public
corporation. Conversely, the culture of an established automobile manu-
facturing company is unlike that of a software development firm that re-
cently made an initial public offering of its shares. As a result, it is
difficult to speak of a single American corporate culture. At the same
time, as will be seen, corporate culture is influenced by national culture,
and that factor may tend to give U.S. corporate culture a degree of homo-
geneity, at least when compared to the corporate culture of European
firms. Within individual corporations, corporate governance systems are
constantly interacting with organizational culture, sometimes reinforcing
one another and sometimes conflicting. For example, the prevailing cor-
porate culture in the Enron Corporation seems to have conflicted with,
and indeed overwhelmed, its formal governance system. Thus, the poten-
tial for tension and conflict in a particular corporation between its system
of governance and its prevailing corporate culture may be great.
V. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CORPORATION
Any system of corporate governance must answer a fundamental ques-
tion: What is the objective of the corporation? Seventy years ago, Berle
and Means posed a similar question at the end of their book when they
asked: For whom should the corporation be run?43 They argued that
there were only three possible answers: (i) the shareholders, (ii) the man-
41. FREDERICK, supra note 39.
42. EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURAL AND LEADERSHIP 50 (1985).
43. BERLE, supra note 10, at 356.
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agers (whom they referred to as "the control"), or (iii) the community. 44
As between the interests of shareholders and managers, they believed
that protection of shareholder interests was to be preferred.45 However,
writing during the Great Depression, they suggested that there was a
need to find ways to make the corporation more responsive to commu-
nity needs. 46 They argued that the community was in position to demand
that the modern corporation serve "...not alone the owners or the con-
trol but all of society.
47
It is conceivable, -indeed it seems almost essential if the corporate
system is to survive,-that the "control" of the great corporations
should develop into a purely neutral technocracy. Thus, it is capable
of balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community
and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of
public policy rather than private cupidity. 48
Although Berle and Means are often cited in connection with issues of
corporate governance, they were also clearly concerned about a second
theme that would later emerge in policy debates about the U.S. corpora-
tion: corporate social responsibility.
Berle and Means' idealistic vision of corporate governance and social
responsibility never became a reality. Years later, in the mid 1970s in the
wake of the Watergate scandal and the discovery that major corporations
had engaged in secret political contributions at home and corrupt pay-
ments abroad, a movement developed seeking to find ways to promote
''corporate social responsibility," to impose a duty on corporations to
manage their affairs in the best interests of the community. It was also
during this period that the term "corporate governance" came into prom-
inent usage.49 Numerous proposals were advanced at the federal level in
pursuit of this goal. Except for the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977,50 which outlawed bribery abroad, none of these proposals actually
became law.
Despite periodic challenges to business in the face of political and so-
cial events since Berle and Means wrote seventy years ago, the formal
system of corporate governance embodied in the laws of the United
States has unwaveringly and clearly stated that the objective of the corpo-
ration is to maximize profits for shareholders. Thus the American Law
Institute, after considering various formulations to accommodate social
needs to corporate purposes, finally concluded in its Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance: "... a corporation should have as its objective the con-





48. BERLE, supra note 10, at 356.
49. Veasey, supra note 4.
50. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-213, Title I,
§ 102, 91 Stat. 1494, 1494-95 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m).
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shareholder gain."'5 ' In other words, the purpose of the corporation is to
make profits and the beneficiaries of those profits are the shareholders.
At the same time, following American judicial decisions on the point,
the A.L.I. Principles of Corporate Governance also states that a corpora-
tion: (1) must obey the law to the same extent as a natural person; (2)
may take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded
as appropriate to the responsible conduct of its business; and (3) may
devote a "reasonable amount of resources" to public welfare, humanita-
rian, educational and philanthropic purposes, ". . .even if corporate profit
and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced" 52 (emphasis added).
A.L.I. Principles of Corporate Governance gives only general guidance
for determining reasonableness of resources devoted to such purposes. It
asserts that one important factor is the strength of the nexus between the
use of corporate resources and the corporation's business, stating: "[i]n
general the greater the amount of corporate resources that are expended,
the stronger should be the nexus."' 53 Despite this concession to social
action, A.L.L Principles of Corporate Governance is far from the vision of
Berle and Means. Maximization of shareholder value remains the basic
objective of the American corporation.
In the United Kingdom, the objective of the corporation is basically the
same as it is in the United States. English law makes it clear that the
shareholders are the owners of the company and that a company's board
of directors is required to advance the interests of the shareholders as a
whole. 54 Because of the centrality of shareholders' interests to corporate
purpose, the prevailing model in both countries, which of course share
the common law tradition, is often referred to as the "shareholder model
of corporate governance."
Elsewhere in Europe, in varying degrees both law and policy recognize
that corporations also have the objective of advancing the interests of
other persons and groups beyond the narrow category of shareholders.
Such persons and groups, who may include employees, suppliers, credi-
tors, civic organizations, and the community at large, are usually referred
to as "stakeholders. ' 55 As a result, these countries are said to have a
"stakeholder model" of corporate governance. The prevailing legal tradi-
tion in these countries is that of civil law.
51. A.L.I., supra note 36, § 201.(a), at 55.
52. Id. vol. 1, § 2.01(b), at 55.
53. Id. vol. 1, at 65.
54. WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES STUDY, supra note 33, at 36.
55. For example, the Recommendations of the Norby Commission in Denmark stated:
"[Corporate governance is] [t]he goals, according to which a company is managed,
and the major principles and frameworks which regulate the interaction between
the company's managerial bodies, the owners, as well as other parties who are
directly influenced by the company's dispositions and business (in this context
jointly referred to as the company's stakeholders). Stakeholders include employ-
ees, creditors, suppliers, customers, and the local community." The Norby Com-
mission, Recommendation for Good Corporate Governance in Denmark,
Introduction, (Dec. 6, 2001), available at http://www.corporategovernance.dk (last
visited Nov. 14, 2002).
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For Europeans and others, such as the Japanese, the American empha-
sis on the maximization of shareholder value alone is misplaced as a cor-
porate objective. Not unlike Berle and Means, they argue that the
corporation should be managed for the benefit, not just of its sharehold-
ers, but also of all its "stakeholders," a group that includes shareholders,
employees, customers, suppliers, shareholders, and a wide variety of in-
terest groups in the community. Germany, with its system of co-determi-
nation granting employees a formal role in governance, is often cited as
the prime example of the "stakeholder model." Generally, a stakeholder
model of corporate governance gives stakeholders a "voice" in firm man-
agement and seeks to accommodate their diverse interests in deciding
upon corporate action. 56 Another manifestation of the stakeholder
model in European and Japanese firms is the "relational board struc-
ture," which includes representatives of key constituencies, such as labor,
lenders, and major customers or suppliers, whose positions on the board
are a function of the corporation's special relationships with those con-
stituencies and are unrelated to any shares they may hold in the firm.
57
To what extent does national culture in the United States and Europe
reflect the value preferences for the shareholder as opposed to the stock-
holder model of corporate governance? Charles Hampden-Turner and
Alfons Trompenaars, in a survey of 15,000 managers and employees from
around the world, asked respondents to choose from the following as ac-
curate statements of the proper goal of a corporation: (1) the only real
goal of a corporation is making profit; or (2) a company, besides making
profit, has the goal of attaining the well being of various stakeholders,
such as employees, customers, etc. Out of the twelve nationalities sur-
veyed, the group with the largest percentage of managers and employees
selecting profit as "the only goal" was Americans (40 percent). 58 U.K.
respondents were second with 33 percent. One may therefore conclude
that among industrialized countries national culture in America is closest
to the ideal of shareholder value maximization as a corporate goal.59 On
the other hand, it should be noted, of course, that despite the large per-
centage in relation to other nationalities, 60 percent of the Americans
surveyed nonetheless considered that a corporation had other goals in
addition to making a profit. 60 Consequently, it would seem that the pre-
vailing cultural value preference in the United States might not com-
pletely accord with the U.S. system's stated goal of corporate governance.
56. Sigurt Vitols, Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and the
U.K., in Varieties of Capitalism: the Institutional Foundations of Comparative Ad-
vantage 337 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
57. Alexander Dyck, Privatization and Corporate Governance: Principles, Evidence
and Future Challenges, 16 The World Bank Res. Observer 59, 60 (2000).
58. Charles Hampden-Turner & Alfons Trompenaars, The Seven Cultures of Capital-
ism: Value Systems For Creating Wealth in the United States, Japan, Germany,
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In order to align the interests of managers to the goal of shareholder
value maximization, U.S. corporations have increasingly compensated
their executives in stock and stock options. This is a widespread phenom-
enon throughout American corporate life, a phenomenon that is by no
means confined to CEOs and top managers. As a result, management
contracts and compensation schemes have become important instruments
of governance in the modern American corporation. According to one
study, the typical American corporation now allocates 1.4 percent of its
equity each year to executives and other employees.6 1 In 2000, the value
of options granted by America's 325 largest corporations nearly equaled
20 percent of their pre-tax profits.62 Equally important for managerial
interests, stock has become the currency of corporate acquisitions and
mergers. Thus, a high stock price, presumably achieved to maximize
shareholder value, also allows managers to substantially enlarge the cor-
porate empires over which they preside and from which they derive sub-
stantial benefits. 63
European and Japanese lack of enthusiasm for the shareholder model,
as opposed to the stakeholder model of corporate governance, is clearly
reflected in Hampden-Turner and Trompenaar's survey data. Compared
to the 40 percent of American respondents who believed that the sole
goal of the corporation was to make a profit, only 28 percent of the
Italians, 27 percent of the Swedes, 26 percent of the Dutch, 25 percent of
the Belgians, 24 percent of the Germans, 16 percent of the French, and
just 8 percent of the Japanese had the same preference. 64
The difference between the American and the European and Japanese
models of the corporation is a reflection of, and is driven by, two different
cultural value preferences: individualism and to communitarianism. Ac-
cording to Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, "[t]he individualist cul-
ture sees the individual as 'the end' and improvement to communal
arrangements as the means to achieve it. The communitarian culture sees
the group as its end and improvements to individual capacities as a means
to that end."'65 By any measure, Americans place a high value on the
individual and individualism, a characteristic that has been noted by ob-
servers of the American scene since the time of De Tocqueville. For ex-
ample, of all managers and employees surveyed by Trompenaars and
Hampden-Turner, Americans were by far the most individualistic. 66 In
an extensive survey of individualism in fifty-three countries, Geert Hof-
stede found Americans to be the most individualistic, achieving an indi-
vidualism rating on his scoring system of ninety-one out of a possible one
hundred.67
61. FIN. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2000.
62. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2002.
63. O'Sullivan, supra note 5, at 169.
64. Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, supra note 58, at 32.
65. Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, supra note 38, at 59.
66. Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, supra note 58, at 48.
67. Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind 53 (1997).
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The cultural value of individualism, which provides the individual a
central role in the scheme of things, is manifest throughout the American
system with its emphasis on individual rights and the availability of indi-
vidual legal remedies to enforce those rights. American law and attitudes
towards individual property rights and freedom of contract strongly mani-
fest the American cultural preference for individualism. Transferred to
the corporate arena, the law considers the individual shareholders as
"owners" of the corporation. As such they are legally entitled to all its
fruits. The United Kingdom, sharing a common language, history, and
legal tradition with the United States, also favors the shareholder model
of the corporation. Hofstede's individualism index gave Great Britain a
rating of eighty-nine, ranking it third in individualism behind the United
States and Australia. 68
The European continent and Japan, on the other hand, tend to empha-
size the role and importance of the community more than the United
States. Their special history has caused them to place greater faith in
communitarianism than individualism as a set of values. Europe's em-
phasis on "social solidarity," its skepticism about the merits of unfettered
competition, and the formal inclusion of labor in corporate management
in some European countries all reflect the greater importance that Euro-
pean culture attaches to the community, particularly as opposed to Amer-
ican culture. American doctrines of "employment at will" and "freedom
of contract," both reflection strong individualistic values in contrast with
German concepts of "labor rights" and "good faith" in contracting, 69
which reveal strong communitarian values. This difference is also found
in attitudes toward competition. For example, in one survey whereas
nearly 70 percent of American managers believed that increased competi-
tion as opposed to increased cooperation among business would lead to
greater benefits for society; only 41 percent of German managers, 45 per-
cent of French managers, 39 percent of Swedish managers, and 24 percent
of the Japanese managers had the same view. 70 In Hofstede's individual-
ism index, France and Sweden ranked tenth with scores of seventy-one,
Germany ranked fifteenth with an index rating of sixty-seven, and Spain
ranked twentieth with an index of fifty-one. (Japan ranked twenty-third
with an index of forty-six).71
The heightened importance of communitarian values in Europe would
quite naturally lead to the belief that the corporation, as part of the com-
munity and having benefited from its position in the community, needs to
take account of community interests, not just shareholder interests, in
conducting its operations and distributing its benefits. The relative lack
68. Id.
69. See Steven Casper, The Legal Framework for Corporate Governance: The Influ-
ence of Contract Law on Company Strategies in Germany and the United States, in
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE 387, 388 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
70. Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, supra note 58, at 71.
71. Hofstede, supra note 67, at 53.
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of dispersed share ownership among the public in most European coun-
tries, as compared to the situation in the United States, may reinforce this
view. On the other hand, there is evidence that the stakeholder model,
and particularly co-determination, makes it harder for shareholders to
control management, and that European managers manipulate the stake-
holder model by playing off one set of stakeholders against another in
order to advance managerial interests. 72 For example, one study of cor-
porate governance and the role of banks suggests that affiliations be-
tween banks and their principal corporate borrowers in Germany and
Japan often encourage excessive lending and deferred restructuring. 73
The differing cultural views as to the objective of the corporation may
account for some of the public protests against "globalization" that
American corporations have encountered in Europe and elsewhere. See-
ing the globalization movement led by American corporations whose de-
clared governance system makes a goal of seeking profits for
shareholders without regard to other stakeholders, various groups are
protesting against corporations that refuse to accommodate other stake-
holder interests. A further point of friction may arise as a result of Amer-
ican institutional investors using their holdings in European and Japanese
companies to press American notions of good corporate governance on
European and Japanese managers. In November 2001, for example, the
California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), America's
largest public pension fund, allocated $1.7 billion of its investments spe-
cifically to pursue "active corporate governance strategies" in European
and Japanese markets. 74 Good governance for U.S. institutional inves-
tors means the primacy of shareholder interests.
Many multinational corporations are sensitive to cultural differences
between the American and European views on corporate goals. For ex-
ample during the 1990s, the mantra of "building shareholder value" was a
proclaimed objective of many American corporations and found promi-
nence in both their internal and external communications in the United
States. These same corporations were much more circumspect in Europe,
fearing that explicit statements in favor of shareholder value maximiza-
tion would antagonize European governments and labor unions that
strongly believe that corporations should advance the interests of all its
stakeholders. When asked about this difference in approach, one French
CEO responded: "I drive differently in the U.S. than I do in France. I
also don't manage the same way."'75
72. Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Exter-
nalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163, 190 (Margaret M.
Blair and Mark J. Roe eds., 1999).
73. David E. Weinstein & Yishay Yafeh, On the Costs of a Bank-Centered Financial
System: Evidence from the Changing Main Bank Relations in Japan, 53 J. FIN. 635
(1998).
74. See Press Release, CalPers, CaIPERS Turns Up Corporate Governance Heat
(Nov. 15, 2001) at http://www.calpers.org/whatsnew/press/2001/1115a.htm.
75. Philippe Hasplespleigh, et al., Managing for Value: It's Not Just About Numbers,
Harvard Bus. Rev.. July-Aug. 2001 at 65, 67-68.
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Discussions of corporate governance often stress the differences be-
tween the shareholder and stakeholder models, often going so far as to
state that the shareholder version is the "Anglo-Saxon model" and the
stakeholder variety "the European model." While there are real differ-
ences between the two, care should be taken not to over emphasize them
for several reasons. First, in countries with a shareholder model, the
management and board of directors of the corporation are required to
obey the law, and numerous laws (for example labor and environmental
legislation) exist to protect persons from adverse corporate actions even
though such persons are not technically designated as "stakeholders" and
such legislation does not fit within the rubric of "corporate governance."
Second, among the countries said to have a stakeholder model of corpo-
rate governance, there is a broad variation in the extent to which such
stakeholders actually participate in corporate governance. For example,
in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, and Sweden, the law gives
employees, as a key stakeholder group, in companies of a specified size
the right to elect some members of the company's supervisory board. In
Finland, on the other hand, employees may be granted such a right within
the company's articles of incorporation. In France, when employee
shareholding reaches 3 percent, they may nominate one or more direc-
tors, with certain exceptions. In all other European Union Member
States, again with certain conditions, however, only shareholders elect
members of the company's board. Third. there appears to be some con-
vergence in corporate practice between the two models as a result of
globalization and the listing by large corporations of their shares on ex-
changes of other countries in order to widen their access to capital.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), whose Member Countries include proponents of both share-
holder and stakeholder models, faced this problem in drafting its Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance.76 The OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance seek to bridge the gap between the shareholder and stake-
holder models of corporate governance by stating in articles I and II that
corporate governance should protect shareholders' rights and should en-
sure the equitable treatment of all shareholders. The Principles also state
in article III that "[t]he corporate governance framework should recog-
nize the rights of stakeholders as established by law."'77 At the same
time, it is important not to overemphasize the process of convergence or
to downplay differing cultural values and attitudes that influence and un-
derpin national systems of corporate governance. The differences are
real. For the most part, such differences stem from some deeply held
cultural beliefs.
Although American systems of corporate governance permit, but do
not require, corporate boards and management to take account of social
76. OECD: Ad Hoc Task Force on Corporate Governance, OECD Principles of Cor-
porate Governance (Apr. 19, 1999), available at http://www.oecd.org.
77. Id.
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welfare issues in their decisions, various internal and external factors,
such as pressure from labor unions, environmental groups, and non-gov-
ernmental organizations, have induced U.S. corporations in individual
cases to integrate social considerations in their decisions. This tendency,
however, by no means implies the kind of dilution of shareholder rights
entailed by the extreme stakeholder model. Noteworthy in this regard is
the emergence of "socially responsible investing," by which investors in-
struct institutions managing their funds to take account of certain social
criteria in making investment decisions. As of 2001, it is claimed that $2
trillion in U.S. investments were subject to social responsibility criteria.7 8
To some extent, this trend may represent a slight convergence of the dif-
fering American and European views on the purpose of the corporation.
On the other hand, the growing influence of institutional shareholders
and their increased assertiveness with European and Japanese managers
may also represent a force for convergence toward increased shareholder
rights in Europe and Japan. 79
VI. THE INSTITUTIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. IN GENERAL
The institutions of corporate governance include both those that are
external and those that are internal to the corporation. The external in-
stitutions include government regulatory agencies, stock markets where
corporations list their shares, and the courts that enforce remedies for
violations of corporate governance rules. Thus both the Securities and
Exchange Commission in the United States and the European Commis-
sion are, in a real sense, institutions of corporate governance. The inter-
nal institutions are the mechanisms within the corporation that determine
how it is run. Given that the internal mechanisms are to a large extent
defined and determined by the external institutions, the external and in-
ternal organizations are linked. For example, law and governmental regu-
lations specify the powers of boards of directors and supervisory boards,
the rights of shareholders, and the obligations of managers. Thus, partici-
pants in a corporate enterprise, particularly those that solicit capital from
the public, are not free to organize themselves any way they like, but
must follow rules promulgated by legislative bodies, regulatory agencies,
and stock exchanges. At the same time, all external systems of corporate
governance leave certain governance matters to the discretion of the cor-
porate participants themselves. A fundamental and practical governance
question for corporate managers, directors, and lawyers is therefore: what
matters of corporate governance are determined by external rules, and
what matters are left to the discretion of the internal participants?
78. See Social Investment Forum, 2001 Report on Socially Responsible Investing
Trends in the United States, at http://www.socialinvest.org/area/research/trends/
2001-Trends.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2001).
79. O'Sullivan, supra note 5, at 153.
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The scope of internal corporate discretion varies from country to coun-
try. For example, while Germany requires certain members of a corpora-
tion's supervisory board to be representatives of labor, American
legislation has no such requirement and gives U.S. corporations broader
discretion in the selection of directors. The remainder of this article will
focus primarily on the internal institutions of corporate governance.
Governance is about power. The purpose of any system of governance
is to determine how power is allocated and exercised. Within any pub-
licly traded corporation in Europe or the United States, there are poten-
tially three institutional centers of power: (1) the board of directors or
supervisory board; (2) the managers; and (3) the shareholders. Let us
examine each of these power centers turn.
B. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND SUPERVISORY BOARD
In both the United States and Europe, a board of directors, selected by
shareholders and acting collectively, exists to make key corporate deci-
sions and to supervise management. It is a central institution of corpo-
rate governance. Nonetheless, important differences in structure and
composition exist between the two continents. One significant structural
element to be noted at the outset is that whereas the United States' and
the United Kingdom's laws provide for a single board of directors, certain
European countries, notably Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and
Denmark, require corporations of a certain size to have a two-tiered sys-
tem. This two-tiered system consisting of a management board composed
primarily of executives of the corporation, and a supervisory board com-
posed of non-executives elected by the shareholders and in some cases by
employees. The supervisory board in most cases selects the members of
the management board and assures their accountability to corporate
goals and governance regulations. In the other eleven EU countries, the
unitary board prevails; however, in five out of the eleven, a two-tiered
system is optional. 80 For example, French law provides for such an op-
tion, but only about 20 percent the Paris Stock Exchange CAC 40 and less
than 4 percent of all French socidts anonymes have chosen to create
one.8 ' The two-tiered system separates the managerial and supervisory
functions that are usually combined within the unitary board system into
two distinct organs. The existence of separate supervisory board uncon-
nected to management serves to increase the independence of non-execu-
tive directors and to give them additional power in acting as an oversight
80. WELL, GOTSHAL & MANGES STUDY, supra note 33, at 43.
81. The Director's Liability Under French Law, Franco British Law Society Lecture,
(Nov. 19, 2001), available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/legal connexion/researc/
societes.htm. With respect to commercial companies, Law no. 66-537 of 24 July
1966, as amended, gives French companies the option to create a two-tiered system
consisting of a management boards (directoire) and a supervisory board (conseil de
surveillance). A few large internationally listed companies, such as Peugeot, AXA,
and Total Fina, have chosen to adopt the two-tier system.
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body over corporate managers. In evaluating the advantages and disad-
vantages of the two systems, one study concluded:
The one-tier system may result in a closer relation and better infor-
mation flow between the supervisory and managerial bodies; the
two-tier system encompasses a clearer formal separation between
the supervisory body and those being supervised. However, with the
influence of the corporate governance best practice movement, the
distinct benefits traditionally attributed to each system appear to be
lessening as practices converge. 82
In the United States, corporate governance systems rely heavily on the
corporation's board of directors. Many state corporate laws provide that
"the management" of the corporation is entrusted to or is under the su-
pervision of the board, but in fact no board of director in a publicly
traded corporation "manages" as that term is commonly understood. Al-
though the board has certain key managerial tasks, such as selecting and
removing the company's chief executive officer, and approving important
transactions, the fundamental task of the board in a publicly traded cor-
poration is oversight of the corporation's managers. In the words of one
authority, the board's primary duty is "overseeing management's dedica-
tion to the polestar of profit maximization. ' 83 Efforts in recent years to
reform corporate governance have focused primarily on structural means
to strengthen the board's oversight role. In general, the challenge has
been to allow managers flexibility to conduct management operations in
an efficient way, but at the same time establish processes that ensure
managerial accountability to shareholders for accomplishing the stated
corporate objective of profit maximization. 84
If the board is truly to hold corporate managers accountable to share-
holder interests, the members of the board must genuinely represent
shareholders rather than management. Although shareholders elect di-
rectors, the process has traditionally resembled an election in a one-party
state: management chooses a single slate of nominees, most of whom
were managers or had close relations with them. In recent years, Ameri-
can corporate practice has stressed measures to give corporate boards
greater independence from management in the hopes that the board
would, as a result, represent shareholder interests more vigorously.
Rather than enact legislation on these measures, the approach in the
United States has been to develop codes of best practices and subse-
quently, through pressure by institutional investors and industry groups,
induce corporations to adopt them.
One principle that has found wide spread adoption in practice, though
not in law,85 is that a majority of the board of publicly traded corpora-
82. WELL, GOTSHAL & MANGES STUDY, supra note 33, at 43.
83. Ira M. Millstein, The Responsible Board, 52 Bus. L. 407, 409 (1997).
84. A.L.I., supra note 36, at 77.
85. State corporation laws do not set requirements for persons to serve on the board.
The Investment Company Act, the law governing mutual funds, however, required
that no more than 60 percent of the board be "interested persons." An interested
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tions should consist of persons who are not themselves managers of the
corporation. In 2001, for example, the average board among Standard &
Poor 500 companies had 82 percent of its directors as non-employees. In
Europe also, there appears be a growing trend to include non-employees
in corporate board membership and many of the European codes of best
practice stress the importance of a board's "independence" from manage-
ment. In 2001, 50 percent of the members of an average board of a Ger-
man DAC 30, 92 percent of the members of the average board of a
French CAC 40, 99 percent of the Netherlands Top 21 boards, and 57
percent of the United Kingdom's average FTSE 100 board consisted of
non-employees. 8 6
Not being an employee of the corporation is no guarantee that a direc-
tor will be truly independent of management. A variety of other factors,
such as family connections, financial relationships, and links to control-
ling shareholders, can limit the ability of directors to act independently -
to be, in the words of the United States Supreme Court, "independent
watchdogs. '87 However, independence is a subjective matter. In order to
provide some objectivity to the process, one organization has developed a
set of criteria to weigh board member's independence from manage-
ment.8 8 They include: : (1) not having worked at the company for at least
the last three years; (2) not having personal financial relationships with
the company; (3) not having familial relationship with management; and
(4) not having a connection to major or controlling shareholders. When
these criteria are applied, the percentage of boards with independent di-
rectors falls dramatically in the United States to 69 percent, in Germany
to 50 percent, in the UK to 39 percent, in France to 25 percent, and in the
Netherlands to 7 percent.89 The ready acceptance of an independent
board in American corporations is perhaps a reflection of individualistic,
as opposed to communitarian values, and their impact upon evolving cor-
porate governance.
The collapse of the Enron Corporation, a majority of whose members
were neither executives nor employees of the corporation, leads one to
ask whether other mechanisms are needed to assure director indepen-
dence. The failure of Enron directors to act as "independent watchdogs,"
however, may have been influenced by the social, political, and other
connections that they had with Enron management.
person has specified relationships with the managers of the fund. In 2002, the
required percentage of "disinterested directors" was increased to a majority.
Stock exchange rules also provide for a minimum number of non-executives
outside directors for listed corporations. According to standards adopted by the
New York Stock Exchange on August 1, 2002, independent director must comprise
a majority of the board of directors of all listed companies other than those in
which a shareholder or group of shareholders possess voting control. See The New
York Stock Exchange, available at http://www.nyse.com for text of the standard.
86. Davis Global Advisors, Leading Corporate Governance Indicators 2001 (2001).
87. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 484 (1979).
88. Davis Global Advisors, supra note 86.
89. Id. at 35.
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Other structural devices that have been introduced to strengthen the
board's oversight function include the establishment of specialized com-
mittees to conduct certain key functions. For example, the Securities and
Exchange Commission now requires all publicly traded companies to
have an audit committee. On the other hand, Enron had a specialized
audit committee of independent directors, but it nonetheless failed to de-
tect and correct accounting irregularities. Practices are also evolving in
which most companies have separate nominating and compensation com-
mittees. The basic thrust behind this movement is the belief that a spe-
cialized committee, known to the shareholders and particularly if
composed of independent directors, is more able to perform these tasks
effectively than if they are diffused to the board in general. One of the
results of the introduction of these measures in corporate governance is
that a few American boards have become more activist in recent times
than they were in years past. Thus, one can cite cases of board action to
remove corporate CEOs whose performance was unsatisfactory, and to
turn aside management proposals judged to be inappropriate.
C. THE MANAGERS OF THE CORPORATION
If the selection of corporate directors resembles an election in a one-
party state, the position the CEO in the modern American corporation is
like that of a third-world autocrat. Indeed, like political systems domi-
nated by the "cult of the leadership personality," it is not unfair to say
that most American corporations manifest "a cult of the CEO." It is al-
most an article of faith of American business that the CEO, and the CEO
alone, is responsible for the rise or fall of the corporation's fortunes. Pop-
ular and managerial opinion in the United States considers that Lou
Gerstner single handedly turned around IBM, that Jack Welch built GE
into a modern force all by himself, and that Sandy Weill alone created
Citigroup. CEOs not only manage. They write books. They appear reg-
ularly on television. They are the superstars of American corporate
culture.
In recognition of this role, American CEOs are paid extravagantly.
The average CEO of a major American corporation received nearly $17
million in compensation in 2000 and $15.5 million in 2001.90 According to
Business Week, the average American CEO made forty-two times the av-
erage blue-collar worker's pay in 1980, eighty-five times in 1990, and 531
times in 2000.91 While it is true that almost two-thirds of a CEO's pay
takes the form of stock options, it is also true that the average American
CEO earns almost twice as much as any other nationality. 92
Despite effective performance on the part of individual CEOs, one
may attribute American's emphasis on the role and importance of the
CEO, at least to some extent, to its cultural value of individualism.
90. See www.aflcio.org/paywatch/index.htm.
91. Id.
92. MGMT. TODAY, Mar. 29, 1999.
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Americans believe that organizational achievement is disproportionately
attributable to the actions of the individual leader rather than to the ef-
forts of the group. From the Lone Ranger to Huckleberry Finn, Ameri-
can culture is filled with tales of the individual triumphant. In countries
with a more communitarian culture, such as Germany and Japan, corpo-
rate management tends to be more of a group effort than in the United
States, a factor that influences CEO compensation in relation to that of
other executives and employees. Moreover, European and Japanese cul-
tures with their emphasis on community values and their large number of
family companies seem to give the European and Japanese CEO the sta-
tus of a patriarch or father figure within the corporation instead of the
heroic standing that American culture accords its own CEOs.
In view of the overwhelmingly dominant position given the CEO in
American corporations, it is curious that both the formal and informal
instruments of corporate governance have little to say about the CEO or
other senior executives. Corporate codes and laws hardly mention them.
Informal statements of practice limit themselves to trying to create struc-
tures that will prevent or inhibit the CEO from dominating the board,
whose basic function, after all, is to hold the CEO accountable. For ex-
ample, one emerging tenet of good corporate governance practice, advo-
cated by certain groups, is that the CEO should not also serve as
company chairman. Indeed, many good governance advocates also favor
a chairman who is an outsider rather than a current or recent corporate
executive. It is interesting to note that while the concept of the separate
chairman and CEO is prevalent in many European countries, it is not
common in the United States. For example, in 2001 only 19 percent of
S&P 500 companies had this type of arrangement, while 100 percent of
Germany's Dax 30, 90 percent of the UK's FFSE 100, and 100 percent of
Netherlands's top eleven did.93 The American preference for combining
both offices is no doubt strongly influenced by its cultural faith in the
heroic individual, as well as claims of efficiency made on behalf of this
type of leadership. Perhaps influenced by their own belief in the cult of
the CEO and their own cultural preference for individualism, American
advocates of corporate governance have not pressed as hard for this
structural division as they have for other corporate governance devices.
D. SHAREHOLDERS
In both the United States and Europe, shareholder direct participation
in corporate governance is limited to (1) electing directors or members of
the supervisory board, and (2) approving certain items that require share-
holder approval. With respect to the former, the major difference be-
tween the United States and Europe concerns those countries, such as
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, and Sweden, in which em-
ployees elect some members of the board. The effect of this concession
93. DAvis GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra note 86, at 38.
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to stakeholder participation is to reduce the influence of shareholders in
the governance of the corporation in which they own shares.
With respect to items of corporate action subject to shareholder ap-
proval, there does not appear to be significant difference between United
States and European corporations. 94 Within the United States, individual
state laws grant shareholders, as owners of the corporation, the right to
make decisions directly about certain key matters affecting fundamental
interests of the corporation, such as mergers. The extent of these share-
holder rights can vary from state to state and company to company by
virtue of differing corporate articles and by-laws. The importance of
these rights is seen in proxy fights for corporate control as evidenced by
the battle between management and dissident shareholders of Hewlett
Packard Corporation in 2002 over approval of a $12 billion dollar merger
between Hewlett Packard and Compaq. This battle resembled a political
campaign in the use of the media to influence shareholder votes. Corpo-
rate governance advocates are increasingly pressing corporations to grant
shareholders the right to approve a variety of fundamental issues affect-
ing the corporation, including stock options plans, and to have easy access
to the proxy process. Once again the thrust is to involve shareholders in
certain fundamental corporate decisions as a check on management ac-
tion. These efforts represent a further attempt to affirm the role of share-
holders as "owners," not merely stakeholders, of the corporation.
In general, the Anglo-American system of corporate governance, when
compared to systems on the European continent and Japan, has incorpo-
rated strong legal protections for minority shareholders. Professor John
Coffee has argued that dispersed share ownership in the United States
and the United Kingdom is a product of effective legal protections that
encourage investors to become minority shareholders, not of political re-
strictions on financial institutions. 95 If true, one can make a subsidiary
argument that these legal protections for minority shareholders are them-
selves, at least to a certain extent, the product of a cultural preference by
U.S. and U.K. courts and legislatures for the values of individualism.
The U.S. shareholder rights model may encounter difficulty in being
transplanted to Western Europe and Japan. In those regions, a tradition
of equity holding by corporations from the same country and with ties to
the CEO may stifle attempts by shareholders to curtail managerial deci-
sions that they perceive as threatening shareholder wealth maximization.
VII. THE LEGAL DUTIES OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
Corporate law in the United States has traditionally imposed two basic
duties on directors and officers: a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. Fail-
ure to meet either of these duties can result in legal liabilities enforceable
in a court of law. As a general matter, the law does not impose liability
94. See WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES STUDY, supra note 33, at 38.
95. Coffee, supra note 3, at 644.
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simply because a business judgment taken by the board or management
turns out to be wrong or to have caused the corporation to incur a cost.
Directors and officers are not intended to be insurers of corporate ac-
tions. They are subject to a duty of care that gives both officers and direc-
tors wide latitude. To do otherwise would place American courts in the
unenviable position of judging the wisdom, rather than the legality of cor-
porate acts, something that historically U.S. courts have been reluctant to
do. The basic duty of care, as set out the A.L.I. Principles of Corporate
Governance is that:
[a] director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the
director's or officer's function in good faith, in a manner that he or
she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation,
and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasona-
bly be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar
circumstances. 96
A director or officer is further protected by the so-called business judg-
ment rule:
[a] director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith
fulfills the duty [of care]... if the direct or officer (1) is not interested
in the subject of the business judgment; (2) is informed with respect
to the subject of the business judgment to the extent the director or
officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circum-
stances, and (3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in
the best interests of the corporation. 97
The ALl Principles make clear that in determining what is in the best
interest of the corporation, directors and officers must heed the corpora-
tion's basic objective of enhancing corporate profit and shareholder
gain.98 At the same time, failure to account for'social considerations in
making decisions that are otherwise legal is not a breach of an officer or
director's duty of care, a conclusion that might raise objections among
some Europeans.
The second legal duty imposed on directors and officers is variously
called the duty of loyalty, fiduciary duty, or duty of fair dealing. Basi-
cally, this duty applies to officers and directors in any corporate transac-
tion or decision in which the officer or director has an "interest." A
complicated principle, it provides that in such transactions, if challenged,
the director or officer must prove that the transactions involved are fair
to the satisfaction of a court in order for them to avoid liability. Gener-
ally speaking, regulation of self-dealing by officers and directors is more
stringent in the Anglo-American system of corporate governance than it
is on the European continent; a specific illustration of the relative value
placed on minority shareholder rights in the two systems.
96. A.L.I., supra note 36, § 4.01(c), at 139.
97. Id.
98. Luca Enriques, The Law on Company Directors' Self-Dealing: A Comparative
Analysis, 2 INT'L & COMP. CORP. L. J. 297, 331 (2000).
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The duties of care and of loyalty would have little effect on corporate
behavior without the existence of effective enforcement mechanisms.
Governmental agencies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the U.S. Justice Department, state attorneys general, and state securities
regulators, have traditionally pursued enforcement actions against corpo-
rations, officers, and directors who violate them. In addition, one must
also include another powerful mechanism that probably takes its most
vigorous form in the United States and has no exact replica in Europe or
Japan - the private right of action. The existence of the private right of
action by shareholders is yet another manifestation of the value of indi-
vidualism within American culture. Statements about corporate govern-
ance rarely mention this phenomenon as an instrument for advancing
good corporate governance. Its existence and effectiveness is a product
of both American law and culture.
The American system permits shareholders to sue directors and of-
ficers for injuries that they have sustained either directly by corporate
action or derivatively, on behalf of the corporation, for injuries done to
the corporation because of wrongful actions by officers or directors. To
facilitate such law suits, specialized law firms have arisen that carry for-
ward the suit while assuming the financial risks entailed by litigation.
Their incentive is to recover "attorneys' fees" anda portion of the settle-
ment to which the corporation is judged entitled.
For many institutional investors, the basic remedy and sanction for bad
governance is to sell the stock of the offending corporation or not to buy
it all. Nonetheless, particularly in the United States where corporate liti-
gation is frequent, the existence of a legal remedy serves as one more
factor, along with others, to exert discipline on corporate behavior. If the
American style of corporate governance is to spread to Europe and Japan
by reason of the pressure of capital markets and institutional investors,
one wonders whether shareholder litigation will be far behind. On the
other hand, without a culture that tends to favor private actions by ag-
grieved individuals, including shareholders, it is unclear that private ac-
tions would evolve as effective deterrents to corporate misconduct in
certain European countries.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While sharing a common western civilization, the United States, along
with the United Kingdom, differentiates its corporate system from that of
most countries on the European continent as a result of several important
factors. In very general terms, and while acknowledging exceptions to
the pattern on both sides of the Atlantic, one can summarize American
style corporations and corporations with a European touch as follows:
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AMERICAN MODEL EUROPEAN MODEL
1. management dominated 1. controlling shareholder dominated
2. shareholder focused 2. stakeholder focused
3. wide public share ownership 3. less wide public share ownership
4. strong shareholder rights 4. less strong shareholder rights
5. unitary board structure 5. two-level board structure
6. single powerful leader 6. consensus or divided leadership
7. shareholder litigation culture 7. less strong litigation culture
Models, of course, are merely intellectual constructs. They do not cap-
ture reality in all its complexity. Nonetheless, the seven elements indi-
cated above represent important issues that differentiate and influence
the American and the European approaches to corporate governance.
Significant and powerful forces, such as the need to access foreign capital
markets and the pressure of institutional investors, may tend to foster a
certain convergence among corporate governance systems on both sides
of the Atlantic. Systems of corporate governance, however, are not mere
forms that can be replaced with ease. As John Coffee has argued, they
are more than just a technology that can be chosen at will by corpora-
tions, "a variable that a firm can simply select or contract around." 99
That is because systems of corporate governance, like a society's other
important institutions, contain its cultural values; values that it has come
to believe, rightly or wrongly, are essential for social survival. Conse-
quently, one cannot assume that American values of individualism will
replace European attachment to community values any time soon.
On the other hand, continually stressing the dichotomy between the
American shareholder model and the European stakeholder model may
exaggerate the differences between the two systems of corporate govern-
ance and overlook the impact of forces for convergence such as the activi-
ties of U.S. institutional investors in Europe and the listing of European
corporations on American stock exchanges. While a sharp distinction be-
tween the two models may satisfy persons with a penchant for dialectic
thinking, it may also neglect opportunities to find ways to bridge the dif-
ferences and fail to notice convergence that may already be taking place.
For one thing, the effort to make management, whether American or Eu-
ropean, more responsive to other parties outside of management itself,
can only serve to exert a salutary discipline on managers. The movement
toward more independent directors, whether in Europe or America, is
also a step forward, whether one sees the goal of the corporation as
shareholder profit or stakeholder benefits. The effort, now well advanced
in Europe, to divide the position of chairman from CEO would probably
be seen as beneficial by the shareholders of most American corporations.
In this respect at least, Americans might want to have their corporations
with a European touch. And finally a middle ground, a point of conver-
99. Coffee, supra note 3, at 646.
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gence between the stark shareholder model advanced by Americans and
the extreme stakeholder model advocated by Europeans, may reside in
the notion of "socially responsible corporate governance," a concept that
seeks to bring together two important themes that really have not been
joined thus far: good corporate governance and corporate social responsi-
bility. Rather than force stakeholder advocates to abandon important
community rights and shareholder partisans to give up important individ-
ual property rights, a dialogue between America and Europe might focus
more productively on the meaning of socially responsible good govern-
ance and how it might be applied while allowing values demanded by
both European and American culture to be preserved.
